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Canada bans goods with Xinjiang content

Full Title: An Act to amend the Customs Tariff (goods from Xinjiang)

Summary#

This bill amends Canada’s Customs Tariff to ban the import of any goods made, in whole or in part, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. It takes effect one year after it receives Royal Assent. The text includes no exemptions or licensing scheme. It states the ban applies “despite anything” in the Customs Tariff. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136; Coming into Force)

  • Prohibits importing goods manufactured or produced wholly or partly in Xinjiang. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Applies to all importers, including businesses and individuals; no stated exceptions. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Covers components and inputs, not just finished goods, because of “in part” language. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Overrides other parts of the Customs Tariff. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Takes effect on the first anniversary of Royal Assent, giving a one‑year transition period. (Coming into Force)
  • Preamble cites findings by Canada’s House of Commons and allied jurisdictions regarding abuses in Xinjiang. (Preamble)

What it means for you#

  • Households

    • After the effective date, packages you order that include any Xinjiang‑made content could be stopped at the border. No personal-use exception is in the bill. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136; Coming into Force)
    • Items you carry back from travel that include Xinjiang content could be seized at entry. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Importers and retailers

    • You must ensure imported goods, including parts and sub‑components, have no Xinjiang content. The bill has no de minimis threshold or waiver. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
    • Shipments arriving after the effective date risk detention or refusal if origin checks suggest Xinjiang content, even if purchase contracts predate the law. Plan lead times accordingly. (Coming into Force)
    • Expect to collect and retain supplier documentation that identifies regional origin within China, not just country of origin. The text does not set documentation standards. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Manufacturers with China‑based supply chains

    • You may need to re‑source inputs (e.g., cotton, polysilicon, yarn, chemicals, electronics parts) to avoid any Xinjiang links. The one‑year transition allows time to adjust contracts. (Coming into Force)
    • Contract terms may need updated origin warranties and audit rights. The bill itself does not provide safe harbours. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Online marketplaces and carriers

    • You may face more holds and queries from customs on parcels with China origin, to check for Xinjiang content. The bill provides no expedited process. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Federal authorities

    • Customs officials would enforce a categorical regional ban, not a case‑by‑case assessment. The bill creates the prohibition but does not detail enforcement procedures. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

  • No fiscal note identified. Data unavailable.
  • The bill makes no appropriation or funding allocation. (Bill text)
  • It creates a new prohibition that customs will need to enforce; the text does not estimate administrative costs. Data unavailable.
  • The volume and value of trade affected are not stated. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

  • Creates a bright‑line rule: any goods with Xinjiang content are banned, which is simpler to apply than determining production conditions shipment by shipment. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Closes loopholes by covering goods made “wholly or in part,” reducing the chance that minor assembly elsewhere can mask Xinjiang inputs. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Aligns with findings cited in the preamble, including recognition by Canada’s House of Commons and allied jurisdictions concerning abuses in Xinjiang. (Preamble)
  • Provides a one‑year transition so supply chains can adjust, limiting immediate disruption. (Coming into Force)
  • Sets a clear human‑rights standard in trade policy by making the ban override other Customs Tariff provisions. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)

Assumptions noted: that a categorical regional ban is easier to enforce than case‑by‑case reviews; the bill does not provide enforcement data.

Opponents' View#

  • Over‑breadth risk: “wholly or in part” could block goods with minimal Xinjiang content, affecting complex supply chains and increasing compliance burdens for importers. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Verification challenge: proving the absence of regional content within a country may be hard; the bill sets no documentation standards or exemptions. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Disruption risk: shipments could be delayed or refused if customs cannot verify regional origin, raising costs and causing out‑of‑stock events for retailers. The bill provides no dispute or licensing mechanism. (Customs Tariff amendment, after s.136)
  • Trade and diplomatic risk: a categorical regional ban could trigger pushback from suppliers or foreign authorities. Data unavailable.
  • Implementation capacity: the bill does not include funding or guidance for enforcement, raising the risk of uneven application or backlogs. (Bill text)

Assumptions noted: that verification will be difficult at scale and that shipment delays will be common; the bill contains no operational detail to confirm or refute these risks.

Timeline

Nov 24, 2021 • Senate

First reading

May 10, 2022 • Senate

Second reading

Trade and Commerce
Foreign Affairs