Independent Defence Ombud Reporting to Parliament

Summary#

This bill creates a statutory Office of the Ombud for the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CAF). It sets out how the Ombud is appointed, their term and independence, who can file complaints, what the Ombud can investigate, and how the Ombud reports to Parliament. It also adds related items to the Access to Information Act, Privacy Act, Financial Administration Act, and the Contraventions Act.

• Establishes an independent Ombud who reports directly to both Houses of Parliament, with a 7‑year, non‑renewable term (s. 4; s. 30–32).
• Allows complaints from members, former members, DND employees, cadets, applicants to join, NPF staff, and immediate family members (s. 12(1)).
• Authorizes investigations of individual complaints and systemic issues, with powers to compel documents and testimony, and to access defence establishments, with limited security exceptions (s. 14; s. 17(1)–(4)).
• Requires authorities to respond to Ombud recommendations but does not make them binding (s. 19(3)).
• Creates summary-ticket offences for obstructing the Ombud or making false statements, with fines of $1,000 (first offence) and $5,000 (subsequent) (s. 29; Contraventions Act schedule).
• Converts the existing Ombudsman office (created by policy in 1998) into a statutory office; current staff and the current Ombudsman continue under transition rules (Transitional; Preamble).

What it means for you#

• Households (CAF members, veterans, immediate family)

  • You can file a complaint about any DND/CAF administrative decision, act, or omission that affected you (s. 12(1)). This includes current and former members and their immediate family.
  • The Ombud must try informal resolution first and at the lowest level that can fix the problem (s. 12(2)–(3)).
  • If the Ombud investigates, you and the relevant authority will get a report with findings and recommendations (s. 19(1)–(2)).
  • Your information is confidential, and the Ombud can only disclose what is needed to do the investigation (s. 26–27).
  • If you face threats or discrimination for taking part, the Ombud may report suspected reprisal to the employer under federal public service labour law (s. 19(4)).

• Workers (DND employees; Staff of the Non‑Public Funds)

  • You can file complaints on DND administrative matters that affect you (s. 12(1)(c), (e), (f)).
  • Your employer must respond to Ombud recommendations, stating actions or reasons for not acting (s. 19(3)).
  • Some labour relations issues that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the “employer” under the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act are out of scope (mandatory refusal) (s. 13(1)(d)).

• Cadets and applicants to join the CAF

  • You can complain about administrative matters tied to DND/CAF (s. 12(1)(b), (d)).

• Commanders and DND/CAF authorities

  • You may be required to provide documents, testimony under oath, and access to defence establishments to the Ombud (s. 17(1)).
  • You can temporarily restrict Ombud access where necessary for operations, security, or to protect an ongoing military police investigation, but you must give written reasons and a duration (s. 17(2)–(4)).
  • You must respond to Ombud recommendations within the specified period (s. 19(3)).

• Limits to complaints and investigations (applies to all complainants)

  • The Ombud must refuse or stop an investigation that touches court martial decisions, military judges’ orders, charge‑laying discretion, matters covered by the military police complaints system, certain provincial professional conduct issues, or matters before June 15, 1998 (unless public interest) (s. 13(1)).
  • If the Ombud believes a Criminal Code offence is involved, they must refuse or cease that aspect and may refer matters to the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, considering the wishes of the affected person (s. 13(2); s. 18(1)–(2)).
  • Evidence you give to the Ombud cannot be used against you in court or other proceedings, except for perjury (s. 17(6)).

• General public and Parliament

  • Annual and special reports will be tabled in both Houses and published online within 30 days of tabling (s. 30–32).
  • The Act will be reviewed every 5 years, with a report to Parliament (Review of Act).

Expenses#

• Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• Key fiscal features noted in the bill:

  • Salaries and operating expenses for the Office are paid from funds appropriated by Parliament (s. 8(3)).
  • The Ombud may hire staff under the Public Service Employment Act and engage technical experts, with Treasury Board–approved remuneration (s. 8(1)–(2)).
  • Advisory committee members may be paid remuneration and expenses with Treasury Board approval (s. 21(3)).
  • Fine revenue from offences: $1,000 first offence; $5,000 subsequent offence; frequency and totals unknown (s. 29; Contraventions Act schedule).
  • No official fiscal note published: Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Strengthens independence and public trust by creating the Ombud in statute, requiring multi‑party consultation, approval by both Houses, a 7‑year non‑renewable term, and direct reporting to Parliament (s. 4; s. 30–32).
• Improves fairness and access to redress for members, employees, cadets, applicants, and immediate family by allowing complaints and by supporting informal resolution at the lowest level (s. 12(1)–(3)).
• Enables systemic reform through own‑motion investigations and Minister‑requested reviews, beyond individual cases (s. 14).
• Enhances investigative effectiveness with powers to compel testimony and documents and to access defence establishments, while protecting sensitive operations with narrowly tailored, time‑limited restrictions and written reasons (s. 17(1)–(4)).
• Protects participants via confidentiality rules, security clearances, inadmissibility of evidence in other proceedings, and anti‑reprisal reporting (s. 24–27; s. 17(6); s. 19(4)).
• Increases accountability by requiring written responses to recommendations and regular public reporting, including special reports on urgent matters (s. 19(3); s. 30–31).

Opponents' View#

• Creates another oversight body that may overlap with existing mechanisms (e.g., military police complaints under the National Defence Act) and could confuse complainants about where to go (s. 13(1)(c)).
• Recommendations are not binding; authorities only need to respond with actions or reasons, which may limit real‑world impact if departments disagree (s. 19(3)).
• Penalties for obstructing or misleading the Ombud are modest ($1,000/$5,000), which may not deter non‑cooperation in serious cases (s. 29; Contraventions Act schedule).
• Security and investigation carve‑outs let senior officials temporarily restrict access to information or facilities, which could delay or narrow inquiries (s. 17(2)–(4)).
• Some matters are excluded by law (e.g., court martial decisions, charge‑laying discretion, certain labour and professional conduct issues), which may leave important grievances outside the Ombud’s reach (s. 13(1)).
• Costs are not disclosed; establishing a statutory office with staffing, experts, and an advisory committee could increase spending without quantified benefits (s. 8(1)–(3); s. 21(3); Data unavailable).