Ends religious defence in hate speech cases

Summary#

This bill removes one specific legal defence in Canada’s hate speech law. It would no longer be a defence to say, “I spoke in good faith based on a religious opinion or a religious text,” when charged with wilful promotion of hatred or with promoting antisemitism by condoning, denying, or downplaying the Holocaust (Bill, repeal of Criminal Code s.319(3)(b) and s.319(3.1)(b)). All other existing defences stay in place. The change would take effect 30 days after Royal Assent (Coming into Force).

• Removes the “good-faith religious opinion/text” defence in hate-promotion cases (Bill, s.1).
• Applies both to general wilful promotion of hatred (s.319(2)) and to Holocaust‑denial antisemitism (s.319(2.1)) (Bill, s.1; Criminal Code s.319).
• Keeps other defences: truth; good‑faith, public‑interest statements believed to be true; intent to point out hate to remove it (Criminal Code s.319(3)(a), (c), (d), s.319(3.1)(a), (c), (d)).
• Does not change what counts as a hate‑promotion offence or the penalties (Criminal Code s.319(2), s.319(2.1)).
• Takes effect 30 days after Royal Assent.

What it means for you#

• Households

  • If you are charged with wilfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group, you can no longer rely on the defence that your statements were a good‑faith religious opinion or based on a religious text (Bill, repeal of s.319(3)(b)). Other defences remain (Criminal Code s.319(3)).
  • The same applies if you are charged with wilfully promoting antisemitism by condoning, denying, or downplaying the Holocaust (Bill, repeal of s.319(3.1)(b); Criminal Code s.319(2.1), s.319(3.1)).

• Faith leaders and religious organizations

  • Sermons, posts, or publications that meet the legal test for wilful promotion of hatred or for Holocaust‑denial antisemitism cannot claim the specific “religious opinion/text” defence after the law takes effect (Bill, s.1).
  • Truth, good‑faith public‑interest discussion, and efforts to reduce hatred remain lawful defences (Criminal Code s.319(3)(a), (c), (d); s.319(3.1)(a), (c), (d)).

• Publishers, broadcasters, and online speakers

  • The offence definitions do not change. But if prosecuted, you would not be able to rely on the religious‑opinion defence (Bill, s.1). Other statutory defences still apply (Criminal Code s.319(3), s.319(3.1)).

• Police, prosecutors, and courts

  • Charging standards and offence elements stay the same, including the “wilful” (on‑purpose) requirement and the bar on private conversations (Criminal Code s.319(2), s.319(2.1)). The list of available statutory defences narrows by one item (Bill, s.1; Criminal Code s.319(3), s.319(3.1)).

• Timing

  • Changes apply starting 30 days after Royal Assent. Before that date, the current defences apply (Coming into Force).

• Penalties context

  • The maximum penalty for wilful promotion of hatred or for Holocaust‑denial antisemitism remains up to 2 years on indictment, or summary conviction otherwise (Criminal Code s.319(2), s.319(2.1)).

Expenses#

• Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No appropriation or new program funding is in the bill text. It amends the Criminal Code only (Bill, all sections).

• Possible effects on justice system workload (e.g., prosecutions, trials) are not quantified. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Closes a statutory gap by removing the “good‑faith religious opinion/text” defence, so cases cannot be avoided solely by citing religious texts (Bill, repeal of s.319(3)(b), s.319(3.1)(b)).
• Keeps safeguards for legitimate debate: truth, good‑faith public‑interest discussion, and efforts to reduce hatred all remain defences (Criminal Code s.319(3)(a), (c), (d); s.319(3.1)(a), (c), (d)).
• Does not expand offences or penalties; it only narrows defences, leaving the high “wilful” intent requirement in place (Criminal Code s.319(2), s.319(2.1)).
• Applies specifically to antisemitism tied to Holocaust denial as well as to general hate‑promotion, aligning treatment across both provisions (Bill, s.1; Criminal Code s.319).

Opponents' View#

• Narrows statutory protection for religiously framed speech, which may increase legal risk for faith‑based expression that touches on sensitive topics (Bill, repeal of s.319(3)(b), s.319(3.1)(b)).
• May create uncertainty for religious speakers who previously relied on the specific defence, even though other defences remain, potentially chilling some speech (Criminal Code s.319(3), s.319(3.1)).
• Could lead to more investigations or prosecutions where the religious‑opinion defence would have applied, with related justice system costs. Data unavailable.
• Removes a clear, bright‑line defence and shifts reliance to more fact‑specific defences (truth, public interest, intent to reduce hatred), which may be harder to prove in practice (Criminal Code s.319(3)(a), (c), (d); s.319(3.1)(a), (c), (d)).