Removes Minister Powers in Labour Disputes

Summary#

This bill repeals Section 107 of the Canada Labour Code. That section lets the federal Minister of Labour step into labour disputes to “promote conditions favourable to settlement,” including sending questions to the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) or directing the CIRB to take measures the Minister deems necessary (Bill Section 1). The bill removes those ministerial powers.

• Removes the Minister of Labour’s authority to refer questions to the CIRB (Bill Section 1).
• Removes the Minister’s authority to direct the CIRB to take measures in a dispute (Bill Section 1).
• Leaves all other parts of the Canada Labour Code unchanged (Bill Section 1).
• Applies to federally regulated workplaces only (e.g., air and rail transport, telecom, banking).
• Takes effect on Royal Assent, because the bill has no separate coming-into-force clause (Bill Section 1).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • No direct change to household rights or benefits. Effects, if any, would occur only during labour disputes in federally regulated sectors. Data unavailable.

• Workers and unions (federally regulated)

  • During disputes, the Minister would no longer be able to refer questions to, or direct, the CIRB under Section 107 (Bill Section 1).
  • Other dispute-resolution tools in the Code, such as conciliation and mediation, are not changed by this bill (Bill Section 1).

• Employers (federally regulated)

  • Loss of the Minister’s ability to prompt or steer CIRB action under Section 107. Parties would rely on existing Code processes and their own applications to the CIRB (Bill Section 1).

• Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB)

  • No longer receives ministerial referrals or directions under Section 107. The Board continues to act under its own statutory mandate otherwise unchanged (Bill Section 1).

• Minister of Labour

  • Reduced discretion in active disputes: cannot use Section 107 to refer questions to the CIRB or direct the Board to take measures (Bill Section 1).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No appropriations, new programs, taxes, fees, or fines are created by the bill (Bill Section 1).
• No official fiscal note identified. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Improves independence of the CIRB by removing powers that allow a Cabinet minister to direct the Board’s actions in a live dispute (Bill Section 1). Assumes ministerial direction risks perceived or real interference; quantitative impact on case outcomes is unknown. Data unavailable.
• Reduces executive discretion and concentrates dispute resolution within established, arm’s‑length processes, which proponents say can increase trust among parties (Bill Section 1). Assumes trust improves when political direction is limited; measurable effects on settlement rates are unknown. Data unavailable.
• Clarifies roles: the Minister retains policy and legislative tools, while the CIRB handles adjudicative and regulatory functions without ministerial direction (Bill Section 1).

Opponents' View#

• Removes a tool that can speed up resolution in urgent or complex disputes by enabling ministerial referrals or directions to the CIRB (Bill Section 1). Assumes those powers materially reduced timelines; evidence on average time saved is unknown. Data unavailable.
• May lead to longer strikes or lockouts in cases where ministerial action could have promoted settlement or clarified issues quickly (Bill Section 1). This relies on the assumption that Section 107 interventions were effective; no quantified estimates provided. Data unavailable.
• Limits the Minister’s ability to respond to disputes with broad economic or public impact without turning to separate legislation, potentially reducing flexibility in emergencies (Bill Section 1). Enforcement concerns are minimal, but implementation risk centers on slower coordination; magnitude unknown. Data unavailable.