Judges Gain Power to Bypass Mandatory Minimums

Summary#

This bill would give judges more flexibility at sentencing. It lets courts depart from mandatory minimum jail terms and mandatory prohibition orders when a different result is “just and reasonable.” It also removes the Attorney General’s required consent to delay sentencing so a person can attend a court‑supervised treatment or counselling program, and asks juries in murder trials to offer a recommendation on parole ineligibility that judges must consider.

• Judges could sentence below a mandatory minimum penalty, with written reasons (Clause 1; Clause 2).
• Judges could decline or modify mandatory prohibition orders (for example, bans tied to certain offences), with reasons (Clause 2).
• Courts must consider all other options before imposing a minimum jail term or parole ineligibility, and explain in writing if they still impose it (Clause 2).
• Sentencing can be delayed for a treatment or counselling program without Attorney General consent; the court selects an appropriate program and supervises it (Clause 3).
• Juries in first‑ and second‑degree murder cases may recommend a parole ineligibility period; the judge must consider it when deciding whether to substitute a different period (Clause 4).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • If a family member is sentenced, the judge could tailor the sentence more to the person and case, even when a law sets a mandatory minimum. The judge must give written reasons for any departure or for imposing the minimum (Clause 2). Effective upon coming into force.

• People charged or convicted of crimes

  • Judges may impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum (a floor set by law), if they find it just and reasonable, and must state reasons on the record (Clause 1; Clause 2).
  • Before imposing a minimum jail term or parole ineligibility, the court must consider all other options and give written reasons if it still imposes the minimum (Clause 2).
  • If a mandatory prohibition order applies (for example, certain bans tied to convictions), the judge may decline it or change its conditions, including length, with reasons (Clause 2).
  • You may attend a court‑supervised treatment or counselling program before sentencing if you consent and the court finds it appropriate; Attorney General consent is no longer required (Clause 3).

• Victims of crime

  • When deciding on a treatment or counselling program in place of immediate sentencing, the judge must consider the interests of any victim (Clause 3).
  • Judges must provide reasons when departing from mandatory penalties or orders, which can aid understanding of the outcome (Clause 2).

• Judges and lawyers

  • Sentencing discretion expands “despite” statutory limits, including declared minimums; reasons must be stated and, for minimums, provided in writing (Clause 1; Clause 2).
  • Courts may select appropriate treatment or counselling programs without needing Attorney General consent or a provincially pre‑approved list, and must supervise participation (Clause 3).
  • In murder cases, the jury’s recommendation on parole ineligibility must be sought and considered when determining whether to substitute a different period from the standard 25 years (first degree) or 10 years (second degree) (Clause 4).

• People convicted of murder

  • The jury will be asked whether to recommend a number of years before parole eligibility, and the judge must consider that recommendation when deciding whether to set a different parole ineligibility period than the default (Clause 4).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No fiscal note identified. Data unavailable.
• The bill text contains no appropriations, taxes, fees, or fines (Clauses 1–4).
• Any fiscal effects would depend on judicial use of the new discretion and court‑supervised programs. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Expands judicial discretion to avoid disproportionate sentences, including departures from mandatory minimums when justified, promoting proportionality in sentencing (Clause 1; Preamble).
• Helps prevent miscarriages of justice, including pressure to plead guilty to avoid harsh mandatory penalties (Preamble).
• Supports fairer outcomes for groups disproportionately affected by mandatory minimums, including Indigenous Peoples, women, and people with mental disabilities (Preamble).
• Improves transparency and accountability by requiring judges to provide on‑the‑record reasons for departures and written reasons when imposing minimums (Clause 2).
• Increases access to tailored, court‑supervised treatment or counselling by removing the Attorney General veto and allowing programs the court finds appropriate, while considering victims’ interests (Clause 3).
• Brings more nuance to parole ineligibility in murder cases by inviting jury input and allowing judges to consider substituting a different period where warranted (Clause 4).

Opponents' View#

• Weakens Parliament’s mandatory minimum framework and could produce greater regional differences and inconsistency in sentences for similar crimes (Clause 1).
• May reduce predictability and any deterrent effect attributed to mandatory minimums; this assumes that fixed penalties deter crime more effectively. Data unavailable.
• Could lengthen sentencing hearings and increase appeals due to new duties to canvass “all available options” and issue written reasons, adding pressure on courts (Clause 2). Data unavailable.
• Allows judges to decline or alter mandatory prohibition orders, which could lead to uneven application of safeguards tied to certain offences (Clause 2).
• Removing Attorney General consent and provincial program approval may fragment standards for treatment or counselling programs and shift oversight burdens to courts (Clause 3).
• The new jury‑recommendation language on parole ineligibility for first‑degree murder and broader phrasing for second‑degree could conflict with existing statutory ranges, creating legal uncertainty until courts clarify how these provisions interact (Clause 4).