Summary#

This bill creates the Canada Disability Benefit (CDB), a new federal cash benefit intended to reduce poverty and improve financial security for working-age people with disabilities. The Act sets the purpose and legal framework, but leaves most details—who qualifies, how much is paid, and how often—to future regulations. It requires the government to work with the disability community, report on progress, and allow appeals. It also amends tax law to allow information sharing needed to run the benefit.

• Creates a federal benefit for working-age persons with disabilities; eligibility, amount, and payment rules are set by regulation (ss. 4–7, 11(1)(a)–(f)).
• Requires considering the Official Poverty Line, extra disability costs, and human rights when setting the benefit amount (s. 11(1.1)).
• Allows the benefit to be indexed to inflation through regulations (s. 11(1)(d)).
• Protects payments from most creditors and bankruptcy, but allows garnishment for family support orders (s. 9).
• Authorizes agreements with provinces/territories that must be made public (s. 8).
• Provides for appeals and periodic parliamentary reviews (ss. 7, 14).

What it means for you#

• Households (working-age persons with disabilities)

  • A new federal cash benefit will be available if you meet eligibility rules set in regulations and you apply (ss. 5–6, 11(1)(a), 11(1)(f)).
  • You may need to provide information and your Social Insurance Number to administer your claim (ss. 6.1, 6.2).
  • The exact payment amount, frequency, and any inflation increases will be set in regulations, not in the Act (s. 11(1)(c)–(f)).
  • If you are unable to manage your affairs, a representative can apply and handle appeals on your behalf (s. 11(1)(k)).
  • If you miss an application deadline, you may still get retroactive payments in some cases set by regulation (s. 11(1)(j)).
  • Benefit payments cannot be seized by most creditors or in bankruptcy; however, they can be garnished to enforce family support (s. 9).
  • If you are overpaid, the government can identify and recover debts; penalties can apply for fraud or knowingly false statements (s. 11(1)(o)–(r)).

• Workers

  • The Act aims to reduce work disincentives, but it does not set earnings rules. Any effects on how work income interacts with the benefit will come from regulations (preamble; s. 11(1)(a)–(c)).

• Businesses

  • No direct obligations or compliance duties are created by the Act.

• Provinces and territories

  • The federal Minister can make agreements with provinces/territories to coordinate supports; these agreements must be published (s. 8).
  • The Act does not require provinces/territories to maintain or change their disability benefits; any interaction depends on future agreements and provincial decisions (s. 8).

• Service users and advocates

  • The Minister must provide meaningful, barrier-free chances for people with disabilities to help design the regulations and must report to Parliament on engagement and regulatory progress (ss. 12–13).
  • A future appeals body and process will be identified in regulations; decisions on eligibility and amount can be appealed (s. 7; s. 11(1)(i)).

• Taxpayers

  • The Income Tax Act is amended to allow officials to use taxpayer information to administer and evaluate the CDB (ITA s. 241(4)(d)(vii.51)).

• Timing

  • The Act comes into force on a date set by the government, but no later than 1 year after Royal Assent (Coming into Force).
  • Key regulations needed to start payments must be made within 12 months of the Act coming into force (s. 11(1.2)).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: CAD $6.1 billion over 2024–2029; $1.4 billion per year ongoing (Budget 2024).

• The Act itself contains no dollar amounts; it authorizes payments from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (s. 10).
• Budget 2024 announced federal funding to implement the CDB.

• Province/territory fiscal effects: Data unavailable.
• Administrative costs to run applications, appeals, and compliance: Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• The CDB targets a group with high poverty rates and aims to reduce poverty among working-age persons with disabilities (purpose; preamble).
• When setting the amount, the government must consider the Official Poverty Line, extra disability costs, work barriers, and human rights, which should make the benefit responsive to real needs (s. 11(1.1)).
• Regulations can require indexing, helping the benefit keep pace with inflation (s. 11(1)(d)).
• A barrier-free application process and required collaboration with the disability community should improve access and design quality (s. 11(1)(f); s. 12).
• Protections from seizure and bankruptcy ensure recipients can actually use the benefit for living costs (s. 9).
• Regular parliamentary reviews add oversight and a chance to adjust the program over time (s. 14).

Opponents' View#

• The law leaves core features—eligibility, amount, indexation, and appeals—to regulations, so there is uncertainty and few guarantees in the statute itself (s. 11(1)).
• Implementation could be slow; regulations are only required within 12 months of coming into force, which may delay payments (s. 11(1.2)).
• The Act does not prevent provincial/territorial clawbacks; without binding agreements, other programs could reduce their payments, limiting net gains for recipients (s. 8).
• Compliance powers (interviews, document demands) and penalties for misstatements may burden applicants and create fear of errors (s. 11(1)(q)–(t)).
• Indexation is optional via regulation, not mandated by the Act, so the benefit could lose value if not indexed (s. 11(1)(d)).
• The appeals body and process are not defined in the Act, raising risks of complexity or access barriers until regulations are in place (s. 11(1)(i)).