Summary#

This bill, the International Human Rights Act (Bill C-281), changes four federal laws to increase transparency on human rights, tighten sanctions follow-up, limit broadcast licences linked to certain foreign actors, and restrict investments tied to cluster munitions. It focuses on public reporting, accountability to Parliament, and closing finance and media access gaps.

• Requires an annual public report by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Canada’s international human rights actions, including a list of “prisoners of conscience” Canada is working to free (DFATD Act s.10(4)-(6)).
• Requires the Minister to publicly respond when a parliamentary committee recommends Magnitsky sanctions on a foreign national (Magnitsky Law — new response section).
• Bars the CRTC from issuing or renewing broadcast licences for undertakings vulnerable to significant influence by foreign actors recognized by Parliament as having committed genocide or under Magnitsky/Special Economic Measures sanctions (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
• Prohibits providing loans or holding investments in entities involved with cluster munitions, with a 1-year grace period for pre-existing holdings (Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act s.4; s.6(d.1); Transitional Provision).

What it means for you#

• Households and investors
  • New ban on investing in, or lending to, entities known to be involved with cluster munitions; existing holdings or loans made before the in-force date have a 1-year grace period to adjust (Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act s.6(d.1); Transitional Provision).
  • Mutual funds, pensions, and ETFs may adjust portfolios to comply, which could change fund composition and screening. Data unavailable on impacts to returns or fees.
• Broadcasters and distributors
  • No new or renewed CRTC licence if the undertaking is vulnerable to significant influence by a foreign national/entity recognized by Parliament as having committed genocide or subject to Magnitsky or Special Economic Measures sanctions, including distributors of foreign programming (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
  • Licence applicants may face added due diligence to show independence from such foreign influence (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
• Viewers and listeners
  • Some channels or services linked to sanctioned or genocidal actors may be denied licences or renewals, reducing availability in Canada (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
• Civil society and families of detainees
  • Annual report will list prisoners of conscience Canada is actively supporting, with names, detention details, and government actions, unless withholding is requested or needed for safety (DFATD Act s.10(4)(b), s.10(5)).
  • Government must describe its communications with families and consultations with civil society on human rights (DFATD Act s.10(4)(c)).
• Parliament and advocacy groups
  • When a committee recommends Magnitsky sanctions, the Minister must state whether sanctions were made and explain why or why not; the response must be tabled and posted online within House/Senate timelines (Magnitsky Law — response, tabling, and posting provisions).
  • If Parliament is prorogued or dissolved, the response must still be posted online on time and tabled in the next session (Magnitsky Law — prorogation/dissolution clause).
• Federal departments and regulators
  • Global Affairs Canada must produce a yearly human rights report and maintain web posting practices (DFATD Act s.10(4); Magnitsky Law posting clause).
  • CRTC must apply the new licensing bar tied to sanctioned/genocide-recognized foreign influence (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
  • Enforcement bodies must apply the new cluster munitions investment/loan prohibitions (Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act s.6(d.1)).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No direct appropriations are stated in the bill (Bill, all parts).
• New administrative tasks:
  • Annual human rights report and web postings by Global Affairs Canada (DFATD Act s.10(4)-(6); Magnitsky Law posting clause). Data unavailable.
  • CRTC licensing reviews for foreign influence criteria (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)). Data unavailable.
  • Compliance and enforcement related to the new investment/loan prohibitions (Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act s.6(d.1)). Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Improves transparency and accountability by requiring a public annual report on Canada’s human rights actions and detailed support for prisoners of conscience, including visits and trial monitoring (DFATD Act s.10(4)(a)-(b)).
• Gives Parliament a clear trigger for executive response on Magnitsky sanctions recommendations, with deadlines and public posting, which can speed decisions and deter inaction (Magnitsky Law — response and posting provisions).
• Limits access to Canada’s broadcasting system by foreign actors tied to genocide or under sanctions, reducing influence operations and protecting audiences (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
• Closes financing gaps by banning loans and investments tied to cluster munitions producers or facilitators, aligning with obligations under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention and reducing Canadian financial complicity (Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act s.4; s.6(d.1)).
• Balances transparency with safety by allowing the Minister to withhold names or details when requested by families or when safety is at risk (DFATD Act s.10(5)).

Opponents' View#

• Risk of harm or stigma from publishing prisoner names and details, even with a safety carve-out; decisions to include or exclude information may be contested (DFATD Act s.10(4)(b), s.10(5)).
• “Vulnerable to being significantly influenced” is not defined; the broad standard may be hard to apply, invite litigation, or chill lawful broadcasting relationships, possibly affecting content diversity (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
• Potential impacts on freedom of expression and access to information if channels linked indirectly to sanctioned or genocide-recognized actors are denied licences, even when Canadian editorial controls exist (Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)).
• Compliance burden for financial institutions, pensions, and funds to identify and exit prohibited investments or loans; costs and sell-off timelines may be challenging, despite the 1-year grace period for pre-existing holdings (Prohibiting Cluster Munitions Act s.6(d.1); Transitional Provision). Data unavailable.
• Administrative workload increases for Global Affairs Canada and the CRTC without dedicated funding in the bill; meeting reporting and posting timelines may strain resources (DFATD Act s.10(4); Magnitsky Law posting clause; Broadcasting Act s.22(1.1)). Data unavailable.