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Stronger Federal Whistleblower Protections

Full Title: An Act to amend the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act and to make a consequential amendment to the Conflict of Interest Act

Summary#

This bill updates Canada’s Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) to strengthen whistleblower protections in the federal public sector. It broadens who is covered, expands what counts as wrongdoing, adds supports for those who disclose, and extends the time to file reprisal complaints. It also lets complainants apply directly to the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and increases reporting and oversight. A related change guides referrals to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The law takes effect one year after Royal Assent (Coming-into-force).

  • Expands wrongdoing to include mismanagement, abuse of authority, political interference, and foreign interference (Bill, PSDPA s.8 as amended).
  • Extends reprisal complaint window to 1 year and lets a representative file on the person’s behalf (Bill, PSDPA s.19.1(1)–(2)).
  • Allows disclosures to more people inside a department, and public disclosures in urgent risk situations (Bill, PSDPA s.12; s.16).
  • Requires non-financial support and stronger identity protection for those involved in disclosures (Bill, PSDPA s.11(1)).
  • Lets complainants apply directly to the Tribunal for remedies; adds stronger penalties for retaliation (Bill, new s.21.01; PSDPA ss.42.1–42.3).
  • Increases public reporting and mandates an annual survey of whistleblowers’ experiences (Bill, PSDPA s.38 as amended).

What it means for you#

  • Households (federal public servants and former public servants)

    • You can disclose suspected wrongdoing to your supervisor, someone higher up your chain, your senior officer, or another designated person in your organization (Bill, PSDPA s.12).
    • You have 1 year to file a reprisal complaint after you knew or ought to have known about it; a designated representative can file for you (Bill, PSDPA s.19.1(1)–(2)).
    • You may disclose to the public if there is not enough time to use internal channels and there is an imminent risk to life, health, safety, or the environment (Bill, PSDPA s.16(1)).
    • You can request non-financial support (information on resources and recourse) and identity protection, subject to fairness and other laws (Bill, PSDPA s.11(1)(a), (a.1)).
    • You gain protection from a wider range of reprisals, including threats, discrimination, demotion, dismissal, and measures causing emotional distress or psychological injury (Bill, PSDPA s.2(1) “reprisal” and “listed measure”).
    • You may apply directly to the Tribunal for a decision and remedies within 60 days after being notified under s.20.6 (Bill, new PSDPA s.21.01(1)–(2)).
  • Workers (outside government)

    • Your employer cannot take measures against you just because you provided, on a reasonable belief, information about alleged federal public sector wrongdoing to the Integrity Commissioner (or to the Auditor General if it concerns the Commissioner’s office) (Bill, PSDPA s.42.1).
  • Businesses (federal contractors and vendors)

    • Federal officials cannot end your contract, withhold payment, or penalize you in contract decisions because you or your employees gave, on a reasonable belief, information about alleged public sector wrongdoing to the Integrity Commissioner (or to the Auditor General if it concerns that office) (Bill, PSDPA s.42.2(1)–(2)).
    • Violations carry penalties up to $200,000 and/or up to 2 years’ imprisonment on indictment, or up to $100,000 and/or up to 6 months on summary conviction (Bill, PSDPA s.42.3).
  • Federal departments and agencies (chief executives, senior officers, managers)

    • You must designate senior officers and at least one additional person to receive disclosures; the designee can be outside your organization (Bill, PSDPA s.10(2.1), (3)).
    • You must protect identities of persons involved in disclosures, subject to fairness and other Acts, and provide requested non-financial support (Bill, PSDPA s.11(1)(a), (a.1)).
    • If a disclosure falls under the Conflict of Interest Act, a senior officer must refuse it and refer the matter to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, with reasons given to the discloser (Bill, new PSDPA s.12.1(1)–(2); Conflict of Interest Act s.68 as amended).
    • Expect assessments of internal disclosure procedures by the Integrity Commissioner and possible reviews of how you receive and handle disclosures (Bill, PSDPA s.22(a.1)).
    • You must support expanded annual reporting: numbers and outcomes of disclosures and investigations, broken down by department and region, and results of a new annual survey (Bill, PSDPA s.38(2), (2.01), (2.1)).
  • Service users and the public

    • The Integrity Commissioner will publish more detailed annual reports and survey findings on whether whistleblowers felt protected and supported (Bill, PSDPA s.38(2), (2.01)).
  • Timing

    • All changes take effect one year after Royal Assent (Bill, Coming-into-force). Specific Royal Assent date: Data unavailable.

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

  • No fiscal note identified for this bill. Data unavailable.
  • No explicit appropriations in the bill text. Data unavailable.
  • The bill creates new administrative duties (e.g., additional designated recipients, identity protection processes, annual survey, expanded reporting, internal procedure assessments) that may require resources within the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, Treasury Board Secretariat, and departments (Bill, PSDPA ss.10–12, 11, 22(a.1), 38). Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

  • Stronger whistleblower protections: broader definition of reprisal, including acts causing emotional distress and protections for associates, witnesses, and those mistaken for whistleblowers (Bill, PSDPA s.2(1)).
  • More time and access to justice: 1-year window to file reprisal complaints and a new right for complainants to apply directly to the Tribunal for determinations and remedies (Bill, PSDPA s.19.1(2); new s.21.01).
  • More paths to disclose safely: disclosures allowed to supervisors, higher-ups, senior officers, and designated persons; public disclosure allowed in urgent risk situations (Bill, PSDPA s.12; s.16(1)).
  • Wider scope of wrongdoing: adds mismanagement, abuse of authority, political interference, and foreign interference, aligning the Act with current risks (Bill, PSDPA s.8(b.1), (c), (c.1), (c.2)).
  • Better support and confidentiality: duty to provide non-financial support and protect identities, subject to fairness and other laws (Bill, PSDPA s.11(1)(a), (a.1)).
  • Stronger deterrents and third-party protections: bans retaliation by any employer and retaliation via federal contracting; sets penalties up to $200,000 and/or imprisonment (Bill, PSDPA ss.42.1–42.3).

Opponents' View#

  • Ambiguity risk: terms like “abuse of authority,” “political interference,” and “foreign interference” will be defined by regulation later, which may create uncertainty and uneven application (Bill, PSDPA s.8(b.1), (c.1), (c.2)).
  • Caseload and subjectivity: expanded “reprisal” and “listed measures” (including psychological injury and emotional distress) could increase complaint volume and involve subjective assessments, straining investigative capacity (Bill, PSDPA s.2(1)).
  • Procedural complexity: allowing complainants to apply directly to the Tribunal adds a new litigation path and deadlines that may complicate resolution and raise legal costs (Bill, new PSDPA s.21.01(1)–(2)).
  • Due process concern: a Commissioner’s application to the Tribunal counts as proof of reprisal unless there is evidence to the contrary, which some may view as tilting the process against alleged reprisers (Bill, new provision after PSDPA s.21.3).
  • Oversight limits in security matters: required cessation of parts of investigations involving the Canadian Forces, CSIS, or CSE could weaken oversight in national security areas (Bill, PSDPA s.34).
  • Unfunded mandates: added duties (annual survey, detailed reporting, more designations, internal assessments) may increase administrative costs without dedicated funding in the bill (Bill, PSDPA ss.10–12, 22(a.1), 38). Data unavailable.
Labor and Employment
Criminal Justice
National Security

Votes

Vote 89156

Division 260 · Agreed To · February 15, 2023

For (97%)
Paired (3%)
Vote 89156

Division 621 · Agreed To · January 31, 2024

For (99%)
Paired (1%)