Summary#

This bill, the Lowering Prices for Canadians Act, changes the Competition Act and the Competition Tribunal Act. It raises penalties for anti‑competitive conduct, tightens merger review, and creates bright‑line rules based on market share. It also extends the time to challenge mergers to three years and removes the Tribunal’s ability to award costs against the Crown.

• Mergers that would create 30%–60% or 60%+ combined market share must be blocked or unwound unless the parties prove “substantial procompetitive outcomes” (new merger‑share orders; Exception — procompetitive outcomes).
• Higher penalties for cartels and abuse of dominance: fines up to CAD $25,000,000 or three times the benefit, or 10% of worldwide revenues, plus up to 14 years in prison where applicable (s.45(2), s.49(1), s.79(3.1)).
• “Excessive and unfair” pricing by dominant firms is listed as an anti‑competitive act; prohibition orders no longer require proof of substantial harm to competition (s.78(1)(k), s.79(1)).
• The Competition Bureau gets clearer grounds to launch market studies (s.10(1)(b)(iv)).
• The “efficiency defence” for mergers is repealed; efficiencies become a limited factor with conditions (s.93(1)(g.4), s.93(2)-(3), s.96 repealed; similar change for agreements under s.90.1).
• Post‑merger challenge window increases from 1 year to 3 years (s.97). The Tribunal can no longer award costs against the Crown (Competition Tribunal Act s.8.1(3) repealed).

What it means for you#

• Households

  • More mergers that create high market shares would be blocked or unwound unless firms prove benefits like lower prices, higher quality, more supply, higher wages, or more choice (new merger‑share orders; Exception — procompetitive outcomes).
  • The Bureau can challenge “excessive and unfair” prices by dominant firms (s.78(1)(k)).
  • The Bureau can launch market studies where this would provide insight into competition (s.10(1)(b)(iv)).

• Workers

  • In reviewing high‑share mergers, the Tribunal may treat “increases in wages” as a procompetitive outcome the parties can prove (Exception — procompetitive outcomes).
  • Longer post‑merger review (3 years) means labor market effects of mergers can be challenged for a longer period (s.97).

• Businesses

  • Mergers creating 60%+ combined market share must be blocked or unwound unless you prove substantial procompetitive outcomes. The same applies to 30%–60% share (new merger‑share orders; Exception — procompetitive outcomes).
  • There is also a presumption that significant increases in concentration mean a substantial lessening of competition, unless you disprove it (s.92(2)).
  • The stand‑alone “efficiency defence” is repealed. Efficiencies are only a factor and cannot be based only on income redistribution; the Tribunal must consider impacts like export gains or import substitution (s.93(1)(g.4), s.93(2)-(3), s.96 repealed).
  • Abuse‑of‑dominance penalties increase to up to $25,000,000 for a first order and up to $35,000,000 for subsequent orders, or up to three times the benefit, or 10% of worldwide revenues (s.79(3.1)).
  • Criminal cartel penalties increase: up to 14 years’ imprisonment and fines up to the greater of $25,000,000, three times the benefit, or 10% of worldwide revenues (s.45(2)); similar penalties for certain agreements by federal financial institutions (s.49(1)).
  • “Excessive and unfair” pricing by dominant firms can trigger orders (s.78(1)(k)). Prohibition orders under s.79(1) no longer require proof of substantial harm to competition.
  • The Bureau can review a completed merger for three years, increasing post‑closing risk (s.97).
  • If you prevail against the Crown at the Tribunal, costs cannot be awarded against the Crown (Competition Tribunal Act s.8.1(3) repealed).

• Local governments

  • No new duties. Possible indirect effects through changes in supplier consolidation. Data unavailable.

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• No fiscal note identified. Data unavailable.
• The bill includes no direct appropriations. Data unavailable for incremental enforcement costs at the Competition Bureau or Tribunal.
• Repealing the Tribunal’s ability to award costs against the Crown could reduce future Crown cost exposure in litigation; amount depends on case outcomes. Data unavailable.
• Higher fines may increase federal revenues if cases succeed; amounts depend on enforcement and court findings. Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Stronger merger rules will prevent high concentration that can raise prices and reduce choice; mandatory block/unwind at 30%–60% and 60%+ shares sets clear limits unless parties prove substantial consumer and worker benefits (new merger‑share orders; Exception — procompetitive outcomes).
• Repealing the efficiency defence closes a loophole that allowed anti‑competitive mergers; efficiencies are now only a constrained factor and cannot rest on income transfers (s.93(1)(g.4), s.93(2)-(3), s.96 repealed).
• Higher penalties will deter cartels and abuse of dominance: fines up to $25,000,000 or three times the benefit, or 10% of worldwide revenues, and up to 14 years’ imprisonment (s.45(2), s.79(3.1), s.49(1)).
• Adding “excessive and unfair” pricing as an anti‑competitive act gives the Bureau a tool to address dominant‑firm price gouging (s.78(1)(k)).
• A longer 3‑year window to challenge mergers strengthens oversight of harms that appear after closing (s.97).
• Expanded grounds for market studies help identify barriers to competition and inform policy (s.10(1)(b)(iv)).

Opponents' View#

• Bright‑line market‑share rules (30%–60% and 60%+) are blunt and may block or unwind mergers that could be efficient or necessary for scale, even in small or declining markets, unless firms meet a demanding proof standard (new merger‑share orders; Exception — procompetitive outcomes).
• Shifting burdens and the presumption that higher concentration means substantial harm (s.92(2)) may chill investment and M&A, including procompetitive deals.
• Repealing the efficiency defence reduces certainty for mergers that generate cost savings or innovation; limiting efficiencies to a factor, with restrictions, adds litigation risk (s.93(1)(g.4), s.93(2)-(3), s.96 repealed).
• The new “excessive and unfair” pricing provision is vague; firms may face uncertainty about lawful pricing by dominant players (s.78(1)(k)).
• Extending the review period to 3 years increases post‑closing uncertainty and integration costs (s.97).
• Removing the Tribunal’s ability to award costs against the Crown could encourage weak cases and shift litigation costs to private parties even when they prevail (Competition Tribunal Act s.8.1(3) repealed).