Summary#

This bill amends the Parliament of Canada Act to change how Members of Parliament (MPs) and Senators apply for a Secret security clearance. It deems that an MP or Senator who applies for a Secret clearance has a “need to know” for the purpose of having their application considered, while keeping all other screening steps in place (Bill, subs. (1); Preamble). It does not grant automatic access to any specific documents and does not limit parliamentary privileges (Bill, subs. (2)).

• Deems “need to know” for MPs and Senators at the application stage for Secret clearances only (Bill, subs. (1)).
• Keeps the normal personnel security screening; clearance can still be denied (Preamble).
• Does not require departments to disclose classified information after a clearance is issued (Bill, subs. (1)).
• Leaves parliamentary powers and privileges unchanged (Bill, subs. (2)).
• Addresses a stated gap that there is no standard way for MPs to request and obtain classified information (Preamble).

What it means for you#

• Households:

  • No direct change to taxes, benefits, or public services. This bill affects internal government processes.

• Members of Parliament and Senators:

  • You can apply for a Secret security clearance without first proving “need to know” to start the process. The bill deems that need for the application review (Bill, subs. (1)).
  • You must still pass the Government of Canada personnel security screening. Clearance is not automatic (Preamble).
  • The bill does not guarantee access to any specific document. The deeming applies only to considering your application, not to later disclosure decisions (Bill, subs. (1)).
  • In force on Royal Assent; no delayed effective date is stated in the bill text.

• Federal departments and security agencies:

  • You must treat MPs’ and Senators’ Secret-clearance applications as meeting “need to know” for application consideration (Bill, subs. (1)).
  • You continue to apply standard personnel security screening and can deny or grant based on results (Preamble).
  • The bill does not set new rules for classified document handling or disclosure to cleared MPs/Senators. Existing laws and policies continue to apply. The bill adds a clarification that it does not limit parliamentary privileges (Bill, subs. (2)).

Expenses#

Estimated net cost: Data unavailable.

• Fiscal note: Data unavailable.
• Explicit appropriations in bill text: None.
• New mandate: Consider MPs’ and Senators’ Secret-clearance applications with “need to know” deemed for the application stage (Bill, subs. (1)).
• Expected number of new applications, per-application screening cost, and total workload impact: Data unavailable.

Proponents' View#

• Enhances parliamentary oversight by letting MPs and Senators get considered for Secret clearances without a “need to know” barrier at the outset, supporting accountability on national security decisions (Preamble; Bill, subs. (1)).
• Maintains security safeguards because applicants still must pass personnel security screening before any clearance is granted (Preamble).
• Addresses a process gap: there is no standardized method for MPs to request and obtain access to classified information; this creates a clearer path via clearance (Preamble).
• Narrow scope reduces risk: applies only to Secret level, not Top Secret or special-access programs (Bill, subs. (1)).
• Preserves parliamentary privileges and immunities, avoiding unintended limits on Parliament’s powers (Bill, subs. (2)).

Opponents' View#

• Erodes the “need to know” control at the application stage, potentially expanding the pool of cleared individuals beyond what is operationally necessary (Bill, subs. (1)). Assumes more clearances increase exposure risk.
• Creates implementation and resource strain: more applications would increase screening workload, but the bill provides no funding or staffing plan. Volume and costs are unspecified (No appropriation in bill text; Data unavailable).
• Leaves key gaps: it does not set rules for how cleared MPs/Senators will access, store, or discuss classified information; departments must rely on existing, possibly uneven, practices (Bill is silent on handling and disclosure).
• Ambiguity risk: the phrase “the information in respect of which the application is made” is not defined, which could lead to disputes over the scope of what “need to know” is deemed for at the application stage (Bill, subs. (1)).