Strengthen Counter-Drone Protections for Aviation

Summary#

This bill renews and updates federal powers to detect and stop unsafe or unlawful drones (unmanned aircraft systems). It sets safety standards, adds oversight and reporting, and lays out how airports, key sites, event organizers, and some police can use approved counter-drone tools. The broad goal is to protect aviation, critical facilities, and large events while guarding privacy and civil liberties.

Key changes:

• Extends Department of Homeland Security (DHS) counter-drone authority to October 1, 2030, with tighter coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
• Directs the FAA to create minimum performance requirements for counter-drone systems, set up an FAA counter‑UAS office, and test systems at airports.
• Requires DHS/DOJ/FAA to maintain a list of approved detection and mitigation systems and generally bars systems made by certain foreign enterprises tied to nonmarket economies.
• Lets owners of specific “covered sites” (critical infrastructure, refineries/chemical plants, rail facilities, amusement parks, state prisons) and certain large “covered events” apply to use approved drone detection systems (not mitigation), with training and oversight.
• Starts a pilot that allows selected State and large local police to use approved mitigation tools at covered sites and events on behalf of those owners; includes special programs for the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games.
• Plans deployment of detection systems at large and medium hub airports and some big cargo airports; launches a limited mitigation pilot at up to five airports.
• Sets privacy limits on any intercepted drone communications (immediate disposal, with narrow exceptions and a 90‑day cap).
• Creates penalties for anyone (other than the federal government) who carelessly or recklessly uses detection or mitigation tech in ways that interfere with safe airspace operations.
• Launches a voluntary FAA “Verified Operator” program to give vetted drone operators easier digital access to some restricted airspace.
• Requires drones to present a modernized FAA safety statement to first-time users and get electronic acknowledgment.
• Requires regular briefings to Congress and public annual reports on counter‑drone activity.

What it means for you#

• Airports

  • Expect FAA‑led planning for how detection and, at a few airports, mitigation systems will operate in terminal airspace.
  • Large hub airports must get detection systems within 30 months of FAA issuing performance standards; medium hubs within 4 years; at least 3 big cargo airports within 12 months of guidance.
  • Some airports (up to 5) may host mitigation pilots; airport police may operate mitigation at up to two of those, if authorized.
  • You will join site‑specific planning with FAA/DHS/DOJ and air traffic control. Federal agencies cannot force you to buy or operate these systems for them.

• Critical infrastructure and other covered site owners (energy, rail, refineries/chemical plants, amusement parks, state prisons)

  • You can apply to DHS to acquire and operate approved detection systems at your fixed sites.
  • You must show a drone threat, have a plan, use trained/certified operators, and usually partner with law enforcement (DHS can waive that if you show you can operate safely and lawfully).
  • DHS can revoke authorization if you break safety, training, or privacy rules.

• Large event organizers/security (certain large public gatherings with flight restrictions)

  • Similar to covered sites, you can apply to use approved detection tools during the event.
  • For the 2026 World Cup and the 2028 Olympic/Paralympic Games, DHS will enable selected State/local police to deploy approved mitigation systems.

• State and local law enforcement (large jurisdictions)

  • A pilot lets selected State and “covered” local agencies (serving areas of 650,000+ people) use approved mitigation tools on behalf of covered entities at covered sites/events.
  • You need FAA/DHS/DOJ approval, training/certification, an endorsed plan, and a restricted airspace in place (e.g., TFR). DHS must approve each mitigation act for the first 270 days after initial deployment.
  • The pilot starts with up to 5 agencies, with possible staged expansion if safety and other goals are met.

• Drone operators (recreational and commercial)

  • Operations near airports, covered sites, and covered events are more likely to be detected. Unauthorized flights could be seized, disrupted, or otherwise mitigated by authorized actors.
  • FAA will offer a voluntary Verified Operator program to streamline digital access to some airspace if you meet safety and compliance criteria. Part 135 drone operators are presumed to qualify.
  • On first activation, your drone must display a safety statement; you must acknowledge you read it.

• Drone and counter‑drone manufacturers

  • Small drone manufacturers must ensure the safety statement is shown on first activation and acknowledgment is captured. FAA will publish an example statement you may use or adapt.
  • Counter‑drone systems from manufacturers tied to specified nonmarket‑economy countries generally cannot be used, with narrow exceptions for research/testing.

• Private security firms and others offering detection/mitigation services

  • New FAA enforcement targets careless or reckless use of detection/mitigation tech that interferes with safe airspace operations. Significant civil penalties may apply.

• General public

  • More counter‑drone activity at airports, critical sites, and large events could reduce dangerous or disruptive drone incidents.
  • The bill includes privacy and civil liberties safeguards and requires public annual reports summarizing counter‑drone actions.

• Timing

  • Most authorities sunset October 1, 2030.
  • FAA must set performance standards within 270 days; training standards within 180 days; a list of approved systems within 1 year.

Expenses#

No publicly available information.

Potential cost areas (no estimates provided):

• Federal costs to FAA, DHS, and DOJ to develop standards, test systems, run airport deployments, oversee pilots, train operators, and brief/report to Congress.
• Possible equipment and operating costs to deploy detection systems at airports (subject to appropriations) and to covered entities that choose to apply and operate detection systems.
• Training and certification costs for operators.
• Inspector General joint audits every 18 months.
• Enforcement and compliance costs for FAA and DOJ.
• Civil penalties may be assessed on violators of the new enforcement section.

Proponents' View#

• The bill appears intended to improve aviation safety and protect critical infrastructure and large events from harmful or disruptive drones.
• Centralizing FAA standards and testing could ensure counter‑drone tools do not interfere with aircraft, air traffic control, or communications systems.
• The required list of approved systems, foreign‑manufacturing limits, and spectrum consultations could strengthen security and reduce technical risks.
• Privacy and civil liberties protections (limited data retention and sharing; reporting) and regular congressional oversight could improve accountability.
• Airport planning and deployments aim to reduce costly disruptions from drone activity around runways and terminal airspace.
• The Verified Operator program could reward safe, compliant operators with more predictable access to complex airspace.
• Modernized safety statements at first activation may better inform new drone users and reduce unsafe flying.

Opponents' View#

• One concern is privacy: even with limits, interception of drone communications and records kept for up to 90 days in some cases may raise civil liberties questions.
• The bill does not clearly explain funding sources or total costs for airport deployments, testing, and oversight, which could strain budgets if not fully federally funded.
• The pilot for mitigation is limited to large jurisdictions (population 650,000+), which may leave smaller communities without access to similar tools.
• The exemption from normal public rulemaking (no notice-and-comment for certain determinations and guidance) may reduce transparency and outside input on key technical and policy choices.
• Restrictions on systems made by certain foreign enterprises could limit equipment options and increase costs, especially in a fast‑moving technology market.
• Deployment of mitigation tech carries a risk of unintended interference with aviation or communications if not implemented carefully; the bill relies on testing, approvals, and case‑by‑case coordination to manage that risk.